A Stochastic Solution Concept for n-Person Games by Packel, Edward W.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
A STOCHASTIC SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR n-PERSON GAMES 
Edward W. Packel 
California Inst itute of Technology 
and Lake Forest College 
�r,'t\lUTE OF 
!to'� ,.� � � � 1, 
� i".'.'. ...... 0 
:5 Q 
� ti1 
�� � 
.p�� 4..� 
It SHALL tAfir.�� 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 2'08 
April 1978
A STOCHASTIC SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR n-PERSON GAMES* 
Edward W. Packel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The abundance of solution concepts in cooperative game 
theory is testimony both to its richness and to its elusive and 
seemingly indeterminate nature. One difficulty with virtually 
all current solution concepts is that they of ten fail to make a 
prediction or they predict indiscriminately. Thus, the universally 
embraced core frequently fails to exist, while von Neumann­
Morgenstern solutions and bargaining sets sometimes fail to exist 
and often generate a multiplicity of solution sets too inclusive 
to allow for meaningful falsification. Recent interesting solution 
concepts such as the competitive solution (McKelvey, Ordeshook 
and Winer, 1978) and the "top cycle" (Schwartz, 1970) have 
similar drawbacks. 
While it seems quite unreasonable to expect a single 
game theoretic model to generate viable solutions over a large 
domain of games, the fact remains that outcomes in games are 
invariably achieved and such outcomes are observed to cluster in 
significant patterns. This latter observation applies to recent 
committee voting experiments (Fiorina and Plott, 1978; McKelvey, 
Ordeshook and Winer, 1978) as well as to more classical game 
theory experiments (Kalisch, et al, 1952).
* 
The author wishes to thank Steven Matthews for his helpful comments. 
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This paper develops a stochastic solution concept for 
general n-person games in characteristic function form (with or 
without side payments). Thus, the prediction of the model presented 
is a probability distribution over the space of possible outcomes 
(payoffs). The advantages of such an approach are twofold. First, 
the model always makes a probabilistic prediction which can be 
computed directly or approximated by simulation. Secondly, instead 
of requiring a "yes" or "no" answer to the question of whether a 
given outcome or set of outcomes is to be exalted as being in "the 
solution," we obtain an associated probability. It is hoped that 
the elusive "patterns" observed in game theoretic behavior may be 
explained nondeterministically. We note in passing the conceptual 
parallel between our approach and the considerably more complex 
and highly successful quantum theory of matter (the "players" are 
atoms rather than people). 
The model we develop starts with a natural dominance 
relation on the outcomes and relies heavily qn the theory of 
1 Markov chains. The ideas evolve from and generalize an earlier 
model of legislative decisionmaking (Ferejohn, Fiorina and Packel, 
1978). The model and its results subdivide into two cases. When 
the space of outcomes is finite, the theory of finite Markov 
chains leads to some easily proved theorems and a natural approach 
to computing limiting probabilities. The second situation 
considered allows a continuum of outcomes, imbedded in a Euclidean 
space Rm. We refer to this as the "spatial" case. Here the theory 
of continuous state Markov chains applies. Theoretical develop­
ment for this case is more difficult and limiting probabilities 
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have, to date, only been approachable by Monte Carlo simulation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next 
section presents the required preliminaries on characteristic function 
form games without side payments, from which the more familiar side 
payment games result as a special case. The two subsequent sections 
define the stochastic solution and develop relevant theorems for 
the finite and spatial cases. In each case we are able to show that 
the stochastic solution coincides with a restriction of the core, 
which we call a strong core, whenever a strong core exists. The 
penultimate section considers applications to simple games, side 
payment games, and legislative decisionmaking. Predictions of the 
model are computed and compared with previous experimental work. 
The concluding section discusses possible refinements and general!-
zations of the model and suggests directions for additional 
exploration. 
II. GAMES IN GENERALIZED CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION FORM 
The standard formulation of games in characteristic 
function form implicitly assumes transferable utility and side 
payments. In what follows we use a more general formulation which 
does not require these assumptions. We refer the reader to Aumann 
and Peleg (1960), where a version of these more general ideas was 
first considered, and to Rapoport (1970) for motivation as to 
their usefulness in nonconstant sum games. An exposition of what 
we shall call generalized characteristic function form games, 
along with a case for the importance of games without side payments in 
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political voting processes, can also be found in McKelvey, Ordeshook 
and Winer (1978). 
Let N = {l, 2, • . .  , n} denote the set of players and let X 
be a set of outcomes among which the players must choose. If X is 
finite we need impose no topological structure upon it. Otherwise, 
we assume X is a compact subset of Rm, endowed with its Euclidean 
topology and Lebesgue measure. If we assume that each x EX has 
associated with it a utility or "payoff" to each player, then 
there is no loss of generality in assuming X to be a subset of R n, 
which we do when it is convenient. 
A game in generalized characteristic function form is a 
N X function v: 2 \{¢} � 2 • The interpretation of v is as follows: 
for each (nonempty) coalition C of players, v(C) denotes the set 
of all outcomes that C can guarantee its members regardless of 
actions by players outside of C. If there are no outcomes that 
a coalition C can ensure itself, then v(C) = ¢.
It is natural and consistent to regard v as a simple 
game when each coalition C has either v(C) = X or v(C) = ¢. The 
collection of winning coalitions could then be defined by 
W= {Cc N j v (C) = x}. If X ERm, transferable utility is assumed, and 
side payments are allowed, each coalition C would clearly be wise 
to maximize its joint payoff over v(C). In this case the above 
formulation reduces to a standard game in characteristic function 
form (v: 2N\{¢}�R). These special cases will be revis ited in 
Section V. 
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To proceed with our development, we require for each 
player kt: N an asymmetric binary relation > k on X which gives k's
preferences over the outcomes in X. Note that such an ordering 
results naturally if we assume that the elements of X are monetary 
payoffs. In thls case we would deflne, for x, y  t: X_:::Rm,
th y >k x <= > yk > xk (where the k coordinate xk of x denotes the
payoff to player k assoclated wlth outcome x). The collection of 
individual preferences lnduces, for each coalition C, a coalitional 
preference >C on X defined by
y >cx 
<,= > y >k x Vkt:C.
c 
We say that y is directly accessible from x via C, written x-----y, 
2if C prefers y to x and has the power to enforce the outcome y. 
Formally, 
c x-y <= > y >ex and y E v(C).
To get a measure of the degree of direct accessibility 
of y from x, we define 
C G' c(x, y) = J{CcN lx-y and -(x--y) V C '� C} \ . - -
Thus c(x,y) is the number of minimal coalitions via which y is 
directly accessible from x. We are now ready to proceed with the 
development of our stochastic solution concept for a game v each 
of whose players has a preference ordering over the outcomes X .  
III. THE STOCHASTIC SOLUTION IN THE FINITE OUTCOME CASE
Given a game v:2N\{¢}-+-2X with Ix\ = m, we let X =  {1, 2, . . .  , m}
for convenience.
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The model motivating our stochastic solution
concept is based upon the following assumptions: 
(1) A starting (or default) outcome is selected sto­
chastically. (In the absence of a more natural 
choice, we might allow each outcome to be the 
starting state with probability l/m, though in 
"most" cases our results will be seen to be 
lndependent of the startlng state. ) 
(2) At each step the currently held outcome (a 
temporary status quo) is considered in pairwise 
opposition to each other outcome. 
(3) The probability at each step of moving from a 
currently held outcome i to an outcome j is 
proportional to c(i,j). 
(4) The process is "equally likely" to stop (and 
to choose the currently held outcome) after 
any number r = 0, 1, 2, . • • of steps. 
6 
While it is clear that very few voting or game procedures 
satisfy these assumptions to the letter, there is some evidence that 
voters and experimental subjects often tend to operate on alternatives 
in pairwise fashion. Assumption 3 is at the foundation of our models 
and may not (in the presence of assumption 4) be unreasonable, 
especially when N and X are large enough to impede systematic 
enumeration of preferred outcomes and their supporting coalitions. 
Assumption 4 is clearly idealized, and may not be necessary if 
"convergence" is rapid enough. Also, the model may be easily 
adapted to other probability distributions on the number of steps 
required for termination. Finally, even if the assumptions on which 
the model is based can in no way be seen to operate, it is hoped 
that the model will still generally serve as a reasonable 
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probabilistic predictor of chosen outcomes. Clearly this needs to 
be tested experimentally. 
For each i, j e: X, 1 < i, j < m, let ci. ""c (i, j). We now use- - J 
the nonnegative integers cij to set up a stochastic transition matrix
P = (p ij) as follows:
{c ij/ r cikk=l 
p
ij =
o
ij
m 
if l cik > 0 k=l 
otherwise 
(where o ij = 1 if i = j and 
o = 0 if i # j). For any nonnegative integer
r ijr, the product matrix P is also stochastic and its (i, j) entry is 
the transition probability of going in exactly r steps to outcome j, 
given that i is the current outcome. The solution concept we 
seek now evolves directly from the theory of finite Markov chains. 
r
Assumption 4 suggests looking at P
(r) 
= l! r l Pk and P(oo) = lim P(r),k=O r +oo 
prime objects of interest in the Markov theory. 
(r) The matrix P gives
transition probabilities in r or fewer steps and it is a standard 
(oo) result that P always exists and is a stochastic matrix (see, for 
instance, Kemeny and Snell, 1960). 
Let Q(O) th (q1, q2, • • • , qm) be a row vector whose j entry
(oo)is the probability that the starting outcome is j. Then Q = Q(O)P 
provides the desired limiting probability distribution on the out-
comes and serves to define the stochastic solution to the game v. 
While it is not inconceivable that a solution concept should depend 
on the starting or default outcome, there exists a natural 
necessary and sufficient condition under which the stochastic solu-
tion Q will be independent of Q(O). As expected, the results depend
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squarely upon the elementary theory of finite Markov chains, which 
we now develop. 
Returning for this paragraph to the case of a general out-
come space X, we say that outcome y is (not necessarily directly) 
accessible from outcome x (written x � y) if either x = y or there 
. ck exists z0, z1,. • • , zt e: X with z0 = x, zt = y, and zk� zk+l V.k = 0,1, . . •  , t-1
(accessibility is the transitive closure of direct accessibility). 
-If both x � y and y � x, we say x and y communicate. It is 
immediate that communication is an equivalence relation, decomposing 
X into disjoint sets which we call communication sets. A communi-
cation set C is ergodic if x e: C, y {; C => - (x � y). (When X is
finite this is equivalent to i e: C, j {; C => the (i, j) entry of Pr is
0 for all r). If all outcomes communicate, so that X itself is a 
communication (and trivially an ergodic) set, the matrix P and the 
game v giving rise to it are called irreducible. More generally, 
we call P and v singly ergodic if there is precisely one ergodic 
set in x.4 
Theorem 1: Let v be a game over a finite set of outcomes. Then 
the stochastic solution Q for v is independent of the starting 
distribution Q(O) if and only if v is singly ergodic. 
Proof: See Doob (1953), pp. 170-181. q. e.d. 
We note that Q is independent of the starting distribution 
if and only if all rows of p("") are identical. In this case, Q is
the unique probability vector solution to the equation QP = Q. The 
extent to which the stochastic solution depends upon Q(O) can be 
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estimated by considering the probability that a "randomly generated" 
direct accessibility relation yields an irreducible matrix. Such 
results are described in Moon (1968), where it is seen that the 
probability of irreducibility rapidly approaches unity as the number 
5 of players increases beyond 10. 
The standard game theoretic notion of a core for games 
characterized by a dominance relation singles out the set of undomi-
nated outcomes (these singleton ergodic sets are called absorbing 
states in the Markov theory). In our formulation, the core Eis the 
union of the singleton ergodic sets and can be defined directly by 
E= {xEX lfyEX 3 x+>-y}. 
It is easy to show (see Section V, Example 1) that this core condi-
tion is not strong enough to ensure that E, when it exists, will 
always be an event of probability one according to the stochastic 
solution. It seems natural to define a more restrictive concept, 
the strong core Es' by
E = {xEE I Vy EX with yfx, y .-x}.s 
Thus, outcomes in the strong core are both undominated and 
accessible from all other outcomes, and it follows that Es is a
singleton whenever it is nonempty. It can also be checked that 
E = Es if and only if v is singly ergodic and that E = Es whenever v
is irreducible. 
When X is finite, A.s_X, and Q = (q1,q2, • • •  ,qm) is a
probability distribution on X, we let Q(A) = l qi. We may now 
iEA 
establish straightforward connections between the stochastic 
solution and the (strong) core.
Theorem 2: Let v be a game with finite outcome space X and 
stochastic solution Q (which may depend upon Q(O)). 
i) Es f 0 => Q(Es) = 1.
ii) Q(E) = . l V Q(O) <.=> the only ergodic 
sets are singletons. 
iii) If D denotes the union of all 
ergodic sets, then Q(D) = 1 V Q(O). 
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Proof: i) Let E = {j}. Since j is undominated, it follows that�� s 
the jth row of any power of the matrix P is 1 on the diagonal and
0 elsewhere. Since j is accessible from all other alternatives, 
there must exist some positive integer s such that all entries in 
th s the j column of P are positive. Thus every outcome has a
positive probability of leading to j after exactly s steps. Let 
p > 0 be the minimum of these m probabilities. Then the probability 
of failing to get "stuck" at j from any i after ks steps is 
k k 2_ (1 - p) • Since (1 - p) -+ oo as k-+00, the probability of getting to
j after r steps approaches unity as r-+ ""· We conclude that p(Es) = 1.
ii) =>: An erogdic set C with two or more members must 
by definition be disjoint from E and hence any Q(O) which is non-
zero on C must result in Q(C) > 0 and hence Q(E) < 1. 
<=: By reasoning similar to that of i), the ergodic 
sets contain the only outcomes on which Q can have positive proba-
bility. Since E is the union of the singleton ergodic sets, we 
must have Q(E) = 1 regardless of Q(O). 
iii) This follows by an obvious extension of the arguments 
for i) and ii). q. e. d. 
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This completes our treatment of the finite outcome case. 
Note that for relatively small numbers of outcomes the matrix P(oo)
and hence the solution Q can be determined algebraically or
approximated computationally by matrix methods. For large finite 
outcome spaces (such as a lattice point approximation of a spatial 
game) Monte Carlo simulation appears to provide stable qualitative 
results in a relatively small number of steps. 
IV. THE STOCHASTIC SOLUTION IN THE SPATIAL OUTCOME CASE
In this section we assume that X is a compact subset of 
Rm (Euclidean topology) and we let µ denote Lebesgue measure on Rm.
To ensure the convergence needed for the existence of the stochastic 
solution, the individual preferences over X will have to satisfy 
certain conditions. Further restrictions on preferences will be 
needed to get "core preserving" results analogous to Theorem Z. 
Granting such restrictions on preferences, virtually all of the 
finite outcome developments have natural spatial analogs. Likewise, 
the assumptions which motivated the finite outcome model carry over 
if discrete probability distributions are replaced by probability 
measures or associated probability distribution functions. As 
expected, the added technicalities called for in the spatial case 
closely parallel the analytic complexities that arise in going from 
finite state to continuous state Markov chains. We refer the reader 
to Doob (1953) for expository details. 
For each x £ X, let a(x) "" {y £ X J x_s;_y for some C�N}, 
the set of outcomes directly accessible from x. It is immediate 
lZ 
that c(x ,y) > 0 if and only if y £ a(x). This definition provides 
an alternative means of defining the core E, since E = {x £ X J a(x) = 
fl)}. Symmetrically, we define b(x) "" {y £ X J y�x for some Cs:_N},
the set of outcomes from which x is directly accessible. We will 
invoke the following assumptions: 
Al: V x£X, a(x) and b(x) are open in X. 
AZ: E = fl) => :3: £ > 0 3 µ (a(x) ) � £ "iJ x £ X.
A3: If a(y ) ""Ill, :3: a base B of open sets at
0 
y0 such that (VB£ B, y£ B, xtB), x++y
and -(y ++ x) . 
Whether or not these assumptions are satisfied ultimately 
depends upon the nature of the individual preferences on X. Thus, 
if for each x £ X and each player p £ N the preference > forcesp 
{yJy > p 
x} to be open in X, then Al will hold since unions of
finite intersections of open sets are open. A compactness argument 
can be used to show that Al and AZ will both hold if each individual 
preference > 
p 
can be represented by a continuous (utility) function
U : X + R in the sense that y> x <=> U (y) > U (x) . A similar statementp p p p 
applies if, for each p£ N, the correspondence xl---{y£ X J-(y > x)} is
p 
upper and lower semicontinuous on X (for definitions see Debreu, 
1959). Assumption A3 is more delicate and seems to call for both 
continuity and "thin" indifference requirements on individual 
preferences. This assumption is a spatial version of the strong core 
def inition given in the previous sections. It will be used both to 
establish the existence of a limit distribution and to identify it 
6with the core in the case where the core is nonempty. 
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Assuming Al, A2 and A3 in what follows, we now proceed 
with the continuous state Markov chain development. For each x £ X 
and each Lebesgue measurable subset B of X, define 
p(x,B) = 
·{f c(x,y) dy/fc(x,y)dy
B X 
Xs(x) 
if a(x) I 0 
if a(x) = 0 
where integration is with respect to Lebesgue measure on Xs Rm and
XB ·is the characteristic function of B, defined by
X (x)B {: if x £ Bif x t B
For each x £ X, the function p (x, • ) is then a probability
measure on the space of Lebesgue measurable subsets of X, and 
p(x,B) represents the probability of going in a single step into 
the subset B given that x is the current outcome. The collection 
of all these measures as x ranges over X forms a continuous state 
Markov chain (the continuous analog of our stochastic matrix) whose 
"discrete-time" behavior we wish to investigate. The r-step 
transition probabilities evolve inductively as follows: 
0P (x,B) XB (x)
1 
p (x,B) = p(x,B) 
r+l f r p (x,B) = p(y,B)p (x,dy), 
x 
where pr(x,dy) denotes integration with respect to y using the
measure· pr(x,•). 
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( r) 1 f k (oo) We now look at p = �l l p and p r k=O 
lim p(r)
r -+-oo 
• 
In the following theorem we prove the existence of the limit p(oo) .
Theorem 3: Given a spatial game v with associated Markov chain p 
and satisfying Al, A2 and A3, the limiting distribution p(00
) (x,•)
exists for every x £ X. 
Proof: Case I, E = 0 : In this case a(x) 1 0  V x£X and p(x,B) can 
be defined in terms of the density function p0(x,y) =c(x,y) /fc(x,y) dy
x 
since p(x,B) =fp0(x,y) dy. By results from Doob (1953, pp. 192-
B 
214), it suffices to show that µ(X) < 00 and that p0 is bounded on
X x X. The first fact is immediate since X is compact. The 
boundedness of p0 results by noting (conservatively) that
c(x,y) .::_ 2n V (x,y) 3 X x X and c(x,y) � 1 V y £ a(x) . We then have,
using A2, 
po(x,y) c(x,y}1c(x,y)dy 2_ 2n/µ(a(x)) 2_ 2n/£ V (x,y)£ xx x.
x 
Case II, E I 0: From A3 it is immediate that E must contain exactly
one outcome, which we denote by y • Given B £ 8 and x t B, Al, A3,
0 
and the def initon of x ++ y can be used to obtain an open set Ux
containing x and a y x £ B such that y x is accessible in a fixed
number s of steps from every member of U • The sets {U } t B formx x x x  
an open cover of the compact set X\B and hence give rise to a finite 
T subcover {U } 1• xt t= 
Letting s = max {s }, we conclude from the
l<t<T xt 
form of p(x,B) (and Al) that there is q > 0 such that 
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ps(x,B) > q V x E X\B. By A3, the process is "stuck" in B once it 
gets there. Now we proceed in a fashion similar to the finite 
outcome argument of Theorem 2. The probability of failing to enter 
B from any x EX\ B after ks steps is 2_ (1 - q) k. Since (1 - q) k + O 
as k -+ 00, the probability of befog (and staying) in B after r steps 
approaches unity as r -+  00• Thus p(
00)(x,B) =lVxEX\B. Since BE B 
was arbitrary and B is an open base at y0, we conclude that 
(oo) p (x, • ) exists for all x £ X and that 
(oo) 
P (x,B) 
{: 
if Yo£ B 
otherwise 
As in the finite outcome case, we let Q(O) define a 
starting probability distribution on X. Here we take Q(O) to be 
a density function so that, for B�X, JQ(O)(x)dx is the probability 
B 
of starting with an outcome in B. The stochastic solution for the 
spatial case is the probability distribution Q on the Lebesgue 
measurable subsets of X defined by 
, Q(B) =JQ(O)(x)p(00)(x,B)dx, 
x 
giving the probability of a final outcome in B.
Corollary: Under the hypotheses of Theorem 3, if a core E for the 
game v exists, then E is a singleton set and Q(E) 1. 
Proof: This follows directly from the last part of the proof of 
Theorem 3 and the definition of Q. 
q. e.d. 
q. e.d. 
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Conditions under which Q is independent of the starting 
distribution Q(O) are precisely as in Theorem 1. We state the 
result for completeness. 
Theorem 4: Given a spatial game v satisfying Al, A2 and A3. Then 
the stochastic solution Q is independent of the starting distribution 
Q(O) if and only if v is singly ergodic. 
Proof: See Doob (1953, pp. 192-214) for the case where E = 0. If 
E 1' 0, Theorem 3 and its corollary provide the proof. 
It is unclear at this time just what connections might 
exist between Al, AZ or A3 (or continuity assumptions on individual 
preferences) and single ergodicity. 7 It seems plausible that 
conditions like connectivity or convexity of X may also be impor-
tant in this regard. 
It should be clear that unless some very convenient 
preferences are used in the spatial case, computing solutions is 
likely to prove very difficult. A useful alternative, when 
preferences are computationally tractable, is an approach using 
Monte Carlo methods. This is the method used for estimating 
spatial results in the next section. 
V. APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
In this section we illustrate the stochastic solution by 
computing or approximating it in a variety of situations. When 
possible, we compare the results obtained with existing experimental 
data. The purpose of such comparison is not to confirm or reject 
q.e. d. 
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required to obtain a (strong) core (Plott, 1967; Davis, DeGroot, 
and Hinich , 1972), wh ich occurs at x
3 
Summarized in Figure 1 are ten experimental runs of this 
game (from Fiorina and Plott, 1978). Figure 2 plots simulation 
results of ten runs each carried out to ten steps and also gives 
descriptive statistics of fifty such runs. In all experimental and 
simulation runs, th e upper right-hand corner point (200,150) was 
taken as th e starting outcome. Qualitatively, the th eoretical and 
experimental results appear to be in accord, th ough convergence as 
a function of the number of steps is somewhat slower in the Markov 
model if we regard a "step" in an experimental run as the passage of 
. i i 11 a motion g v ng a new status quo. 
[Figures 1 and 2 Here] 
Example 5: This differs from Example 4 "only" in that voter 3 has 
his ideal point moved from the previous core point (39,68) to the 
point (51, 59). Th ere is no longer a core. It can be shown th at 
th ere is only one ergodic set and it properly contains the Pareto 
optimal quadrilateral determined by the other four ideal points. 
Figures 3 and 4 summarize, respectively, experimental 
results (from Fiorina and Plott, 1978) and results of fifty runs of 
a Monte Carlo simulation where termination occurred after fifty steps. 
[Figures 3 and 4 Here] 
We do not offer any comparative statistical analyses of 
the results obtained in Examples 4 and 5, contenting ourselves with 
th e comment th at th e visual results are striking.
12 
Note th at the 
Fiorina-Plott experiments used a simple set of parliamentary 
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Very little experimental work seems to have been done in 
these finite outcome situation�. It would clearly be of interest 
for our purposes to have the results of such experiments. Even 
the exceedingly simple Example 1 raises the interesting question of 
whether real players would reach outcome 5 without having started 
there.8 
The third example illuf.trates a spatial game in which 
side payments are allowed. It is a four-person constant sum game 
in normalized form. We take the outcome space to be the set of 
imputations (payoffs whose entries sum to 1) along with the starting 
outcome Q = (0,0,0,0). 
4 4 Example 3: X= {(x1,x2,x3,x4) ER lxr � 0 anrt L � = l}U{Q.},k=l 
N= {1,2,3,4}. v({l,2,}) = v({2,3}) = 3/4; v({l,3}) = v({2,4}) = 1/2; 
v( {1 , 4) J • v( {3,4 l) = 1/4; v(S) = {: 
player k, x >k y <=> � > yk.
if ls I < 1 
if Is l > 3 
For each 
Judiciously chosen simulation results for the stochastic 
solution and results of some RAND experiments (Kalisch et al, 1952 
as described in Luce and Raiffa, 1957) are shown in Table 1. Each 
run of the simulation used a Monte Carlo approach starting at 
outcome Q and proceeding for fifteen steps to obtain a "final"
outcome. "Convergence" appeared to be rapid enough that large 
groups of runs of anything exceeding ten steps exhibited no 
qualitative differences in means or standard deviatio�s. Both the 
20 
similarities and differences in individual runs and means are 
interesting. Overall means and payoff variation from run to run 
are similar in both experiment and theory, but coalitional behavior 
is somewhat different. This latter fact is not surprising given 
the nature of our model and the methods used in the actual experi-
ments. In the experiments, time was limited (ten minutes) for 
each run and players were exhorted to act selfishly. There was 
neither the time nor the encouragement to consider outcomes pair-
wise. Also, a total of eight laboratory runs does not appear to 
be a usefully large sample given the variability in each run. 
Nevertheless, theory and experiment seem relatively compatible and 
both are consistent with the Shapley value for this game.
9
[Table 1 Here] 
The last two examples arise in the context of spatial 
10 modeling in legislative decision theory. The outcome space X is
2 a subset of the positive quadrant in R and individual preferences
on X are induced by locating each player (voter) at a point of X 
and letting the utility (preference) for a given player decrease as 
a continuous function of the Euclidean distance from this "ideal" 
point. Absolute majority rule is the voting mechanism. 
Example 4: X = [0,200] x [0,150], N= {1,2,3,4,5}, 
v(S) = {: 
if J sJ �3
Figure 1 describes the ideal point xi
otherwise 
3 for each voter i EN. It is important to note that x is at the
intersection of the diagonals of the quadrilateral determined by 
the other four ideal points. This is precisely the condition 
17 
our solution concept, but simply to see to wh at extent and under 
what conditions the stochastic predictions made by our model are 
in reasonable accord with laboratory results. The first two 
examples are simple, finite alternative games using absolute 
majority rule as the voting procedure. 
Example 1: X =  {1,2,3,4,S}, N = { Pl' P 2, P3, P4},
v( S ) • {: u Is l > 3otherwise 
Individual preferences on X are given by: 
pl P2 P3 P4
1 2 3 4 
2 3 4 1 
s 5 5 5 
3 4 1 2 
4 1 2 3 
It should be clear by inspection that a core E = {S} exists 
for this game, but that the core is not a strong core. Indeed 
outcome 5 is accessible from no other outcome. The transition matrix 
P is given by 
p 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
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and th ere are two ergodic sets, {S} and {1,2,3,4}. In accord with 
Theorem 1, the stochastic solution must depend upon the starting 
distribution Q(O). Indeed P(oo) has the form 
t t t t 0
! ! ! ! 0
p (oo) � I t ! ! ! 0
! ! ! t 0
0 0 0 0 1 
and for Q(O) = (q1,q2,q3,q4,q5), we have 
Q -
( 1- qs, 1- qs, 1- qs, 1- qs ' 1- qs, qs) .- 4 4 4 4 4 
Exam�: x = {1,2 ,3, • • .  ,11}, N = {p1 ,P2, P3, P4, P5} • 
v(S) = 
{
: 
Hisl_:::.3
otherwise 
pl 1 2 8 7 3 6 10 4 
Pz 2 10 3 7 4 s 6 9 
P3 3 4 7 5 6 9 11 1 
P4 4 8 10 5 9 11 1 6 
P5 5 11 l 8 10 2 6 3 
5 9 
1 11 
8 2 
2 3 
7 4 
It can be checked that this game h as no core and is 
11 
8 
10 
7 
9 
irreducible. Hence th e stochastic solution Q is independent of Q(O) . 
In fact, computer matrix calculations yield Q =  (. 16, .12, . 13, .14, 
.15, .01, . OS, . 09, . 03, . 07, . OS). 
2.5 
procedures for group decisionmaking which is close to the spirit of 
our status quo, pairwise comparison modeling assumptions. It is 
becoming increasingly clear that the choice of procedures can have 
immense influence upon experimental outcomes (Plott and Levine, 1978; 
Isaac and Plott, 1977) and the stochastic model appears to hold up 
well under a "sympathetic" but commonly made choice of procedures, 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Summarizing briefly what has been done here, we have 
proposed a stochastic solution concept for a broad class of 
cooperative games as the end product of a natural dynamic model of 
outcome selection and coalition formation. Some fundamental theory 
was developed for the finite and spatial outcome cases, exploiting 
the model's intimate connections with the theories of discrete and 
continuous state Markov chains. Stochastic solutions were then 
computed or approximated for a variety of situations and comparisons 
with experimental results were made when possible. 
Inevitably, with a model as simple as the one proposed, 
a number of potentially worthwhile refinements come to mind. We 
summarily discuss a few of these. The requirement of minimality for 
a coalition to contribute to c(x,y) is open to question. We have 
invoked minimality to avoid a form of overcounting, but it is quite 
conceivable that some situations might be treated better without it. 
In either case, the Markov chain connections and the theorems and 
proofs of Sections III or IV are the same. This also applies to 
numerous other possible ways of generating transition probabilities 
between alternatives. 
26 
The transition process, as currently modeled, does not 
rule out selection of a given outcome even though it is Pareto 
dominated (defeatable unanimously by all players in N) by some other 
outcome. Restriction to the Pareto set might make for more rapid and 
tighter convergence. In fact, experimental subjects do not always end 
up choosing Pareto optimal outcomes and our model seems to do quite 
well without imposing this restriction. An even more severe 
restriction could require each enforcing coalition to implement 
only outcomes in its Pareto optimal set. Such behavior would be 
game- theoretically natural, but might often prove to be destructively 
myopic in that it would maximally motivate excluded players to break 
up the coalition with a counter-coalition, continuing the game 
another step. 
A refinement which might prove quite worthwhile is to 
graft onto the model a more sensitive stopping mechanism. While 
our process models the dynamics of the outcome flow very naturally, 
this is less true for the way the game stops. Though in most cases 
stochastic convergence seems rapid enough that letting the number 
of steps go to infinity does not pose a problem, a better stopping 
mechanism may be achievable by having it depend upon the number of 
steps elapsed, the current set of directly accessible outcomes, and 
the number of minimal coalitions which can enforce these outcomes. 
We leave these ideas for future consideration. 
The computations in Table 1 f or Example 3 illustrate an 
interesting by-product of the stochastic solution when the outcome 
space consists of n-tuples of payoffs to the players. By computing 
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FIGURE 1: Outcomes of 10 Fiorina-Plott Experiments with Core 
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FIGURE 2: Outcomes of First 10 of 50 Simulations Runs -10 Steps Each 
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FIGURE 3: Outcomes of 15 Fiorina-Plott Experiments with No Core 
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FIGURE 4: Outcomes of 50 Simulation Runs - SO Steps Each 
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the mean of the stochastic solution (this requires an integration 
in the spatial case) we obtain a " stochastic value" for characteris­
tic function form games (see footnote 8). If V is a simple, side 
payment game, then this value becomes a stochastic power index. 
In closing, we emphasize the need for a variety of 
additional carefully designed and administered experiments to test 
the stochastic solution and to define its areas of applicability. 
Our model has not assumed that the underlying game be super­
additive, for instance, and it is not clear to what extent our 
model will be reasonable in the absence of this and other " real 
world" conditions. The overall idea and its currently rather 
sparse results seem compelling, but a vast network of operational, 
theoretical, experimental, and computational paths remains to be 
explored. 
1.
2. 
3. 
FOOTNOTES 
Application, in this context, of the elementary theory of 
Markov chains is also made in Shenoy (1977). The ideas 
developed here arose independently and rely on more sub­
stantive aspects of the Markov theory to obtain limiting 
probability distributions. 
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In game theoretic terminology, the standard terminolocy is 
that " y  dominates x. " We choose to employ the "accessibility" 
language in conformity with Markov chain terminology. 
Confusion between outcomes and players, who have also been 
indexed by the positive integers will, hopefully, not arise. 
Henceforth the letters i and j always denote outcomes. 
4. The ergodic sets are what Shenoy (1977) takes as his 
" elementary dynamic solutions. " The " dynamic solution" is 
the union of all ergodic sets, so our game V will be singly 
ergodic precisely when the dynamic solution is an elementary 
dynamic solution. The idea of taking ergodic sets and their 
union as solution concepts appears to originate with 
Schwartz (1970 ) and has also been used by Kalai, Pazner, 
and Schmeidler (1976). Neither of these papers employed 
Markov chain ideas. 
5. 
6. 
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I am indebted to Phil Straf fin for calling my attention to 
Moon's book and to the connections between tournaments and 
the ideas considered here. 
One specific and important class of preferences for which Al 
and AZ are satisfied is the Euclidean "loss function" 
preferences used in spatial models of legislative decision-
making. With these preferences, a core "usually" does not 
exist (Schofield, 1977), in which case A3 holds by default. 
When there is a core, A3 can be shown to hold in important 
special cases (Ferejohn, Fiorina and Packel, 1978). 
Preferences which locate players on the vertices of an n-1 
dimensional simplex in Rn and use barycentric coordinates 
to generate preferences would also appear to be natural and 
promising for the purposes of our approach. 
7. In the Euclidean setting described in footnote 5, McKelvey 
(1976) shows that, with X =R
m
, not only will we have single 
ergodicity; but, in the absence of a core, irreducibility 
results. An additional by-product of using this setting (and 
probably other continuous preference settings) is that there 
is no "periodicity" in the accessibility relation. As a 
consequence of this aperiodicity (see Dobb (1953) for details) 
the "Cesaro" limit P(oo) can be replaced without affecting the 
co r results by P = lim p . 
r + oo
finite outcome case. 
A similar remark applies in the 
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In brief, will Example 1 be a (confessedly contrived) case 
where the core is not likely to be the outcome of a player-
symmetric simple game? Before implementing Example 1 
experimentally, Charles Plott suggests adding some "losing" 
outcomes in a manner which will reduce the obvious "fairness" 
of outcome 5 by virtue of its constantly central position. 
This can readily be done without altering the character of the 
example. For useful laboratory results on Example 2, as far 
as testing our model is concerned, a great many runs (and a 
great many dollars) would be needed for comparison with our 
stochastic predictions. 
A second experimental series of eight runs was made in the 
RAND experiment on a game strategically equivalent to that of 
Example 3. The mean of these runs was (.28, .30, . 24, . 18), 
closer both to our simulation mean and to the Shapley value. 
The "stochastic value" obtained by computing the mean 
imputation over the stochastic distribution Q is, like the 
Shapley value, invariant with respect to strategic equivalence. 
Technically, neither the experiments nor the simulation were 
"spatial," but rather both used the large finite (30,000 ) set 
of outcomes determined by the integer lattice points of the 
2 
set X= [0 ,20 0 ]  x [0 ,150] £ R • It seems reasonable to 
expect that no significantly different results would have 
obtained- (other than communication problems for the experi-
31 
mental subjects) had both situations been purely spatial. 
In point of fact, since all payoffs, subjects, and computers 
are essentially limited to a fixed finite number of decimal 
places, there is no such thing as a truly spatial game. 
ll. If we regard a "step" as the formal proposing of a new status 
quo, rather than actual passage, then simulation convergence 
is slightly more rapid than experimental "convergence." The 
mean number of steps under this definition in the Fiorina-Plott 
core experiment was sixteen. Simulation results for ten steps 
give roughly similar results, while such results for sixteen 
steps have a mean of (39.2, 67.9) and a total standard 
deviation of 1.1. At twenty-five steps the simulation hits 
the core (39,68) virtually every time. We do not attach too 
much significance at this point to these convergence compari-
sons. 
12. I am indebted to Carl Lydick for his thoughtful and ingenious 
program ing of the simulations and their graphical output for 
Examples 4 and 5. 
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